Homes respond to everyone

The problem with homelessness is it doesn't make sense, financially it is a framework for ruin. The residue is a ambition of future politicians and the popularity of identity and ideology has undermined the reason behind it. I suggest homelessness is a  new paradigm, a sort of ridiculous decline of values for the sake of the pantomime. The difficulty is the homeless do not get there by themselves, just restore the threat to all of us from authority, whether religious of economic. I say homelessness is the future division in Europe, a crisis of monetary proportions.

The homeless live in shelters or do not survive and the public should understand why homelessness does not end. I argue the value of a person homeless is less than one pence. The future of the care of the homeless is non-viable, but bravery has no price tag. The country should not be consumed by the position, and one way out is for groups of writers to tackle every aspect of the nonsense. The eating habits of the homeless should be undermined through education about health and accidents living all day on streets animals cannot manage.

The country need not donate large sums, it doesn't get there, the city men and women gets more of it than a homeless man. The money is given to the chancellor and he feeds it into institutions. Less known is the price, he keeps over half. The religious institutions may claim great losses, but they fail to redistribute the money they get for the needy to actual homeless individuals.

A solution is to reinvent housing as not the state or private landlords, but as a charitable approach to encouraging self-independence. This would resist pressure from landlords through a single method of purchase and negate the state from participating in social reinvention. The state is financially rewarded and the money goes to its economic network. Individual housing saves the state money, but doesn't reward the private landlords mentioned earlier.

The chosen people

Immigrants travel to get jobs a leading Minister declares, the European Union concerns the free movement of goods and encourages workers to travel to find work. The free movement of workers is not enshrined in European law, but unemployed individuals use European legislation to find work in the UK. This kind of nonsense shows the Union at its best, finding jobs and undermining government bureaucracy like immigration for economic reasons. The channel frontier fails to let immigrants travel to the UK, or should do, I suggest we look at why government policy is encouraging this trend, and not undermine those trying to administer it.

The immigrants of Calais are unemployed, they come from Libya, Iraq and Syria. Eastern immigrants do not travel to the UK because frontiers like Calais make them poorer. The European legal framework encourages barriers to illegal immigration and allows trade that avoids punitive taxes when it crosses frontiers. French borders are porous like ours, but not steel. The access of eastern Europe to to our work is requested by European agencies like the UK government, it has quotas and pays for publicity out of national finances.

The difficulty with the poor is not solely due to our economic policy, gypsies and travellers are crossing frontiers because they do not recognise them and the politics of the UK in the Union is similar. Money is allocated to their education, and their travel plans. Landed and farmers do not want them to create a permanent community on their lands. The division is class, not heredity. The government fails to acknowledge that it protects them to avoid embarrassment. The immigrants do not mix with these communities, they wait in cities to find communities that will accept them. First sending someone before them to a region that appears urban.

Free movement if prevented would increase taxes, impede travel at airports and increase barriers to trade which firms pay when crossing frontiers like the Channel. The immigrants support such a move, like the UK Independence Party, by creating division, the Conservatives create decline in populations and social cohesion in disparate locations, like Scotland. The framework is irregular and the response unpredictable, and Scotland fails to admit to this politics in mainstream circles. The immigrants may not care, but London is occupied by these groups in its suburbs. They bring resources and employment and not social outcasts and old age is becoming the issue in this area, especially the cause of unemployment and services for old age.

War and systems

War in the Ukraine has taken a decisive turn with the destruction of a Malaysia airliner. War starts for obvious reasons, but their origins are often a decisive point in their later development. The recession may be worsening the west's position over Ukraine, but the war started over the annexation of Crimea and the development of Russian policy towards Ukraine, the destruction of the airliner threatens to draw international attention to the issue and expose Russia to its enemies and domestic opponents. I would expect this to be taken as the start of a war over separatism.

Wars are externally powered and internally suffered and decided. The Ukraine issue is unimportant to Russians and Ukraine is internally divided. The threat is from intervention by outside powers and the European Union is not one. I suggest Russia has interests in the region that could threaten its national power base, and this is why it is vulnerable on the issue. Ukraine has more to loose but is being determined by western interests. he conflict is between these interests and Russia fears, and unluckily for the US government Russia is no longer territorially dominated by the future of the Moscow leadership.

War is a threat when technological powers interlock, their existence depends on resolution because of the interests created. Russian fears are great because the west is involved and the south threatens the west with new abilities and resources which it finds difficult to control. War is a witches broth and Shakespeare is too often taken seriously on this issue. Ukraine is starting to interest the west, and this could indicate a longer period of conflict than political actors are expecting. Nationalism is a force in the west and east and unlike other Communist nations the interaction is likely to spill over into other integration issues.

The cost of war is often ignored is figures as well as resources and tragedy. The post-decade undermines those who benefitted because of these reasons. The tactics ensure this is a result because of global status and new alignments like Nato are often misjudged as benefitting host nations. The threat is determining the outcome in terms of nationalism, but is the outcome determining the cause. The cost of war would logically prohibit it, but like the origins Ukraine is an issue which was avoided and developed because of its central geographical position.

Wars can be stopped, not by political actors, but external powers and influential individuals who have the time and money to invest in human resources. They can also be accelerated and the threat is greater than the growth of casualties or expenditure. War is a terrorist force and history accepts its verdict. The common man has the vote but not enough influence to save his or her life. Rights are decided by the victors and Nato worsens their chances, not supports them. I argue the victory is complete when the hypothesis is accepted of the reason and benefit of the outcome.

Ukraine and risk

The rights of individuals are not the rights of states. A Ukraine is not separatist declaring independence and individuals are that secede from a state. The east is therefore not what Russia makes them and neither is Ukraine. The state in Russia has no legal right to interfere in the Ukraine if it has sovereignty, and logically should support the Ukraine against the east. Putin's widely published speech against Ukraine's sovereignty in Crimea, is complete nonsense and as is calling Ukraine separatist.

Leadership tactics show that Russia is failing badly and new insurrection is likely because of the gap in legitimacy. The Ukraine is also make a poor political decision in allowing the east to hold referendums and in not being more legitimate about its rights. Laudable it is, but Putin will not give them a second chance. He seems bent on covert military action and the society in Russia likes these strong arm tactics after the Cold War. Young Russians are keen to prove they can catch-up with the west. But rights of Ukraine does appeal to the west, and it is likely that there will be some kind of response if Ukraine fails.

Military reaction is the answer to Putin's troubles, like all dictators he has based his support in the army and gives foreign states an non-comital response. In other words he does not give them the time of day. Ukraine's freedom depend on an educated response from the west because the state has less economic power than Moscow. Russia too fears an educated response to this crisis. Russia is essentially a bureaucratic power relationship, and fails in supplying the population's needs.

America economic sanctions are meaningless except in individual terms, because Russia leaders control the money supply and the relationship to natural resources. But it is an expression of disgust and an educated threat. The east Ukraine is trying to change this relationship, and lacks education in its actions. A referendum being held as we speak will nullify the west in Russia's eyes and the gaffe in Putin's speech on Crimea. BUt will not harm the Ukrainian state or the west. But the east is its fear, and Russia fears its citizens.

The politics of west versus east is an old one, and Europe means nothing except a belief in democracy and institutions. Russia needs this legitimacy and Europe is a Russian tactic, not a physical reality except in the European Union. The west is a kind of economic relationship and it is is not essential. But freedom from European institutions is, and the EU is bound to defend the Ukraine. Is Russia claiming it must defeat them? I suggest the response is from Putin alone and the proof is in this referendum. A free vote is the answer to his political legitimacy, like any politician, and more violent reaction may eventually follow.

Russian possibilities

While the attention of the world is on Syria, the Russian relationship with the Ukraine was under suspicion because of its proximity to Russian heartlands. Syria was perceived by the west to be in its sphere of interest, but the Ukraine which had a more successful revolution was forgotten. The rebellious republic image was replaced by an enlargement of the economic links Europe had been seeking in the 2000s over energy. The oil reserves in the North were not even allowed this political content, except as a source for terrorism and political movement. Russian foreign policy became beset by technical difficulties and Europe's reaction was seen as exploitative and miscellaneous.

The global view was also ignored, it was seen as joining the north in the technical revolutions of the twentieth century, but not enduring the luxury of twenty-first century politics. Russian foreign policy is best when it is placed in a European context, and the future of the Republics has never made it in substance. The democratic credentials prove this, Russia is a telegraph, it is a pity no-one can show divisions in the message. The summit again confused the issue, and transformation, not obligatory communications are the best part of the political bridge.

Russian foreign policy to South America, is again less than informative, and the division between conflict and consensus roughly driven by American and global communications. The third world was neither a division between north and west, or east and south, but the message did deliver it. The point lies in the political equality implied by the communications, neither political or economic they dwell on social questions and a political individualism. Mill would be resting quietly at the double meanings behind politics in the Ukraine and South America. The truth is politics is not about policy, and local interests are easily assuaged.

The Chinese take a different approach to global relationships, but the spheres of interests are similar and easy to uncover. Russia of course says nothing about its southern borders to Europe, but magnifies the realism in social analysis of conflictual relations. Foreign policy is therefore about communications, not institutions in foreign countries. Home divisions are left out of the question in ideology. The liberal ideal is not becoming a utopian dream in Russia, and this is disguised. Foreign policy is not that important, but our response is leading in its miscalculation in Russia, and in other areas. By transmitting realism, we are ignoring and misconstruing western interests. How important is it? If the divide is kept precise, only Russia looses, if it is confused neighbouring states lose out like the Ukraine. Hence the visit by Britain to China was wildly mistimed and German attempts to attract attention in America were badly intentioned.

Old age

The elderly and old age depend on different divisions according to social scientists, I argue old age is growing with the means of production and the elderly are in conflict with it. Capitalism is neither a stage for old age, nor a battle cry of the elderly, and this is why many disagree with capitalist theories of production. Old age is not a means of survival, it is a battle of generations and the elderly are respected as a division within it.

Capitalism is an integrative process and many in the business world have beneficial experiences of it. The elderly are a social framework, a kind of political resistance and old age an integration in a division of capitalist linguistic frameworks, that suggest globalisation is not what people make it, but is a kind of word that influences leaders. The elderly are therefore, not old and age is a category. Capitalism is threatening in this approach and the start of a new entity called globalism.

Capitalism is an integrative theory, a sort of approach to division that erases the status drop. But although this may approach the problem of old age, the unemployed are more likely to undermine it because of the institutions that uphold it. In my approach old age is more likely to fear capitalism as a psychology, and the elderly to have nothing to do with it. The integration is thorough the unemployment agencies which share national insurance with the old age agencies.

Does capitalism integrate the elderly? Of course it doesn't, although both are along the time line and it is unlikely that the elderly would know it either. In face generational disease is timed, and capitalism may be a way of transforming it to a smaller section of the population. Capitalism therefore is a psychological integration of old age. All institutions of the elderly are psychologically directed.

Politics of old age can also be looked at as a social integration, because mental health and other agencies direct the elderly and business has a social direction. The routines of parliaments are directed by these pressure groups and interest groups protect the latter. Capitalism may therefore be able to direct the elderly, and old age integrate with it if political leaders want that. The difficulty with this is institutions and their power over historical time.

East and South

The cause of the threat is many sided, but Europe is a two way relationship. Firstly Europe has Russian origins and Russia has an interest in its security relationship. The other side is the relations between Europe and the United States, this changes the function of the former in eastern approaches to the United States. Russia is therefore not a friend of Europe and the recent events in Syria reinforce this idea. Europe has an affinity for Russia, but is constantly rebuffed. The relationship is broken by European distrust and Europe plays its superiority against this joker in the pack. The effect is to distance Russian society from European elites. Secondly Russia is becoming divided in its approach to the Third World, and these signals undermine the antipathy between Russia and Europe's intellectual approach.

The price is its criticism of Russia to American audiences, the conflict between Russian homelands and their European neighbours and the diplomacy which has been hostile for about one hundred years. The method is to create barriers which the Russians overcome. The aims a sort of chess in which no-one actually can win, the game starts again after the interval and a game is what it is. The ending a kind of Russian ballet, in which the ballerina is in tears but the show carries on. The price is therefore nuanced and the relationship suffers in generational phases.

The cause has no conclusion, it is a question and there never is an answer. The reason is therefore power politics and the direction neither left nor right, a sort of neutral in a rusted gearbox. The European relationship overrides the social framework in this way, and like all politics is ultimately flawed because of this. The combination of factors is seen in the issues, the Falklands nationalism lie in a Cold War silence that people felt was suffocating them. The politician needed a victory with the background of the Cold War. The war in Afghanistan can be seen in the British approach to warlords. Like the isolation it gave continental Europe in the 1960s, Afghanistan was not let in and the French were allowed to participate and not partake in the planning process, at least in the Westminster sense. This Cold War was like the other one, and the light of day didn't find it for over ten years.

The cause of Europe's isolation takes angles as well. It is a crisis, but one which has been squashed because of a lack of answers. Can we make peace, not should we find the allies a new member. The difficulties of letting them in, this is not, but a lack of reception which has clear causes and consequences. This kind of power play is destructive, because Russia takes it seriously and the west feels the consequences. The playwright would say change the ending, the people cut one scene and the politicians lose a character in the plot. The division occupies intellectual minds, the ending unnerves Russian planners. Until recently the occupiers were undermining foreign forces, facing historical changes and threatening wars in Africa.

The threat of Europe is everywhere, because of its power apparently or its reach in history. I argue peace is worth it or at least the end of the Cold War. American participation is unlikely to be effective and ideological confrontation destructive. We need to shorten the game and take the queen, checkmate is not a Russia solution. The future lies in the social and the politics is upset by short battles. We are not passing a law, the game is military in character. The short approach is to define the goal and find a solution to our concern. It will achieve nothing if we play that game. Approach is not the end of the couplet, it is the beginning of the next conflict and not an answer.