The British ideology

The risk of external foes is significant to a sovereign state, the intimidation of citizens is a risk for legitimacy in proposals. The poisoning of citizens is not an act of war, but a goal of terrorists or criminal ideologies. Secret servants are local and react to universal principles that support this position, the demagogue has no legitimacy if these rules are broken. I suggest institutions form in similar ways and for similar purposes. The threat comes form added interpretation.

The events in Britain seem a risk to democracy in the media, a threat to fairness in society and has murdered members of security and former ideological foes. This creates an adversarial tilt to these events, and criminals may be taking advantage. The society is less about principle in daily life and more about ideology, the threat is to home cadres and party sympathisers. The future lies in institutional identities and political isolation. The point is to rule against this kind of power and illustrate the  principle of justice.

But while meaningful democracies support this kind of inquisition, other more bruised identities have  a realistic agenda based on war and home divisions. Britain must not step out of line and old rivalries can obscure this clarity.  The principle of goal and net not system and right. The human rights Russia has advocated in Ukraine are not infringed by the murder of UK victims. The British ideology is insistent that these rights are not accepted.

Britain is a small force and territorially the smallest it has been since the early societies. It has its own concerns like former roles and powers to angry neighbours. No longer a member of the EU, it seems immediate conflict with Russia has occurred. In fact Julius Caesar is an opportunity, Russia may have taken advantage. The British are waiting for the evidence and the record of the government is outstanding in this area.

The Russians and Syria

The aim of Russia is uncovering the link between Assad and Putin and suggests a new outlook by the Russians. The global is less important than the regional and the local is undermined more easily. The outlook is new because of globalisation and the links between Russia's enemies. The future of the region is less important than the international views stacked up against its role there and the social impact a linear approach to decline and aloofness. The Russia bear this is not, and a liberal victory against these  positions.

Russia is not challenging the west in Syria, it is securing its integrity among its neighbours. The future lies in social matching and political theft. The west fallen into this trap, and the way out is political and economic. Russia hates foreign fighters, but a framework is not a threat to boundary control.  The aim of Russia is to distill these approaches and overcome local ties. The armies have less compulsion to act suitably.

Syria has to bring about change, Russia is useful and a deterrent of social weight. It needs cover for its guerila strategy and will take the conflict to its southern neighbours. Russia is already there of course and renewed camouflage is important. The foreign armies are also a target because they encourage risk. Syria has the moral high ground, but this does not have to be the sole aim of Syria. Dissolution is growing larger battlefields and ideological organisation.

The future for the west may be like Iraq.  For Assad the end is coming and Russia won't mind another sting in the tail. The rebels  will be an outcome of the new Syria and a sort of deduction about threat. The Russian fighters are less likely to find tangible rewards, and the principle of solution is a vocabulary that has a weak link. The democracy of Russia may be helped in this way, as will be the future of Ukraine.

The model of democracy

The politics of the economy means states and societies are larger than life, the nation something positive and  reduced fear of the state. Societies are social in realism, and framed by economic statistics. The model of the nation is a construct from these perspectives, I argue the model in Russia is similar to elsewhere, but the region and identity of citizens are not.

The Chinese model is redistributive, because of globalisation, and sent to war with the west by American exploitation. The model is intransitive, and it undermines democratic principles because of it. The region has agricultural and historical problems, but the model does not show all of them. The Trump visit was a fact finding tour, and lot redistribution in its assessment.e

The French model is solving regional aims, and this bites back. The state is cornered by decline in certain industries. The framework is social in aim and forensic in nature, and the model changes according to social principles and economic targets. The reduction in the goals and ambitions of institutions is because of a declining Germany and social targets are solutions.

Russia attacked Syria for political ams at home and economies became advantageous to the mother. The region has economic targets like expanding industry, and failure is not accepted. The reason is historical and political. The consequence is shoring up the home against foreign invaders.

The model of democracy has never been comparative, but the decline is misrepresented in these terms. I suggest we examine the model as a reason for growth, because it adapts to norms and local directions in nationhood. The model of course is not democratic, and this is a drawback. I suggest we try the imagined space and the institutional rules asa way to unblock the switch.

The risk of human rights

The situation in Ukraine is political and the Americans can't understand Russian influence in the US. Boris Johnson suggests a Cold War and I argue the human rights angle has been ignored. Economic rights are feeble this time, political rights are important and social rights a belief in the shortness of this expansion. Pessimistic description this is not,  a sort of integration that disintegrates. I argue globalisation is a concept like this, and nothing will improve except radicalism. Russia is sincere about using rights to hurt others, creators of this approach disengage at the mention of war.

I push two human rights forward, the right to savings and the right to honour, none are respected in approaches to economics or political hegemony. The threat to honour is big brother, and the savings everything else.  Other rights such as food are harder to justify, prisons use is and these issues are not taken seriously by political actors. The social side is irrelevant to rights, because they depend on the great powers. The political is economic and the  framework is society, why does integrity undermine the rights of unlawful activity, in rights this means social is relevant and political is imprecise, the political integration has social goals.

Russia is an outsider and this rough ground has become a victim of political manipulators. Vladamir Putin's reputation has caught up with him and he may have become vulnerable to political attack. I suggest Britain has left reason and taken the opposite path, and much as over Europe, the change is against integration and multipolar responses, leading to growing paralysis of a human rights.  Politics is a  defeat for nationalism, a kind of Herculean attitude in the last century. The international approach is appeasement, the responsibility growing political abuse. The economic angle is universally an isolator.

The serious point is social and society become a reaction to minuscule movements in political origins, leading to social division and political weakness. The right have used rights as a political juncture in the UK and figures are undermining the moderate left. The social theory is underachievement and leads to political suicide by the liberals. The political a causal and the future is political theory of integration and political hegemony in order to have an impact.

The old coming into new dawn

The threat of China is against the principles of organisation, it suggests local power and capitalist influence, the threat is organisational and risk averse. I argue the new dawn is a China with nuclear weapons from client states. The opposition is framework and discipline and the leaders would prefer ideology. The visit by Trump was well timed and the result has reverberations in Europe. The risk is our divisions and the danger a lack of military resolve. China is not democratic or principled and its leader a solvent of the Communist hierarchy. The risk is to identity and the opening a resource of local authority.

Was Trump right to visit? The continuity shown by pro western sentiments is worrying, the honesty of Chinese leaders will be compared to western ones. The principle is identity and the ideology a way to manipulate home shores. Why does China matter, it has a rebellious nature and a solvent of its institutions which are violent and treacherous. The leaders may be immune from total responsibility and their opposition takes the blame. How do identity crises undermine threat. Only for economic reasons.

The new dawn is not Deng replaced, it is norms reestablished and government transvested.  We will become one of those islands in the sand, a sort of death that requires foreign destruction and political equality. Lets look at some alternatives. Destroy Chinese nuclear weapons, regionalise the outbreak of hostility of risk principles in the east. The new dawn is Chinese and only the leadership identifies with it. Undermine frameworks and you will get growth. The new dawn has less chance of success than distant onlookers think, and a powerful alliance of UK and America seems to bode well.

The Chinese are not only in China, Taiwan is Chinese. The threat is from diasporas and identifying social hegemony. The globe is growth not political relationships, but leaders must remind themselves of the USSR and forget notions of Cold War supremacy. The power is framework, the context Russia and America, and this puts the UK in a dangerous position. All could be lost by us and this has implications of a Cold War with China excluding Russia. The politics is risk and ideology. the reverse is continuity, China is an acorn and can't be rebranded.

The EU and UK budget

The EU built our motorways and our bridges and money was paid from the EU in structural funds to accomplish it. An approach of integration and a resort to blackmail, but also a way of getting around British budget discipline. The British budget did similar things for the EU and the recent events show  that separation is not easy and can last a minimum number of years. The problem is building and decay and the future is construction and surplus. The budget has always been observed publicly and the the moeny from our pensions was earmarked for Britain, not other EU countries. The new budget will have to raise taxes and the direction will be left not right, because money is flowing outwards.

The integration of the UK is not regarded in a EU method, but Scotland is mindful of British taxes spent on their position. The south is less interested, the City is going down with disintegration and the investment is going into a split method of location. More money will go European because of enlargement and adjustment to British localism. The money for the English has to be reallocated to pension support and employment creation, in the the Thatcher years money fled. Hence the UK  is reallocated taxes that are not there, and the EU  is finding it a bad future portfolio.

I argue Boris. Johnson has a foreign perspective on disintegration as did the UK on Scotland. The EU budget is not a social budget, it is political and economic, so Britain with its expansive social policy will loose out when disintegration takes place. The money on agriculture is political, as is new kinds of industrial organisation. The EU has no city, but inhibits identity that suggests this is the case, Britain will hang its head in shame if it is a city depression. The future of employment needs to change to overcome these obstacles, and only this will be enough. Hardly monetarism, and suggests reliance on social issues.

The global picture is also unsettling, the power of the institutions is directed domestically and towards Europe, and the profit is ideological and top heavy, dependent on foreign bonus culture and it suggests domestic policy sillier than in the 1930s. The democracy has been an ideological tool in Europe and undermined economic principles. The sustainability of ideology against neighbours that can't access your markets is hopeless. The critical juncture is economic, not political and is not being understood. No oil, no domestic industry and taxation hss a low turnout position that is enough to sink the policy.

British taxes

The EU tax regime is obviously at stake in Brexit, higher taxes on the working class and lower organisational levels in national insurance, the tax threshold is getting higher. The future of tax is important without EU dangers, not just publicity but means of collection and decision-making procedures. These are VAT and interest rates and the income tax is difficult to change in this environment. Local businesses are fearing the worst and likely to hit by low trade levels. Industry requires networks and the City organised dealing, none of these are any easier with a fixed income tax. The reason is political as well as social, its not support for the EU, but ideological ambitions which shape taxes and without these institutions taxes must rise.

In the long term the structure is robust and only mistakes will shatter this critical juncture's legacy. Pensions require a sound investment portfolio and war is not helpful other than starting the revolution. Economically several avenues are available. Low investment. high taxes or structural deficits, the reason the structure of EU trade, it unlike Kondratiev is rising and this means a shortfall. The tax also requires investment, something not heard these days in the City. The tax is equal risk and universal benefit, hardly the beginning of growth. Changes require solid money and this means external investment, unfortunately this is not a tax plan. No security, no solution doesn't work in the medium term, because of income tax and degrees of redistribution like small businesses.

New taxes are less likely to work, the poll tax was directed towards high receivers of the national cake, it fell because of the crash and only organised resistance prevented an insurgency. We hear the barricades of tax resistance, do we hear political planning for EU taxes. The economy is not a support system for taxation, but is a social leveller and taxation can become an important issue. The Lloyds of London is a investment vehicle,  the tax should besprent on an equal basis. Private equity is balanced and political in distribution, slightly political in legitimacy and a fall in the predictive value of institutions is penalty accruing.