Ukraine and risk

The rights of individuals are not the rights of states. A Ukraine is not separatist declaring independence and individuals are that secede from a state. The east is therefore not what Russia makes them and neither is Ukraine. The state in Russia has no legal right to interfere in the Ukraine if it has sovereignty, and logically should support the Ukraine against the east. Putin's widely published speech against Ukraine's sovereignty in Crimea, is complete nonsense and as is calling Ukraine separatist.

Leadership tactics show that Russia is failing badly and new insurrection is likely because of the gap in legitimacy. The Ukraine is also make a poor political decision in allowing the east to hold referendums and in not being more legitimate about its rights. Laudable it is, but Putin will not give them a second chance. He seems bent on covert military action and the society in Russia likes these strong arm tactics after the Cold War. Young Russians are keen to prove they can catch-up with the west. But rights of Ukraine does appeal to the west, and it is likely that there will be some kind of response if Ukraine fails.

Military reaction is the answer to Putin's troubles, like all dictators he has based his support in the army and gives foreign states an non-comital response. In other words he does not give them the time of day. Ukraine's freedom depend on an educated response from the west because the state has less economic power than Moscow. Russia too fears an educated response to this crisis. Russia is essentially a bureaucratic power relationship, and fails in supplying the population's needs.

America economic sanctions are meaningless except in individual terms, because Russia leaders control the money supply and the relationship to natural resources. But it is an expression of disgust and an educated threat. The east Ukraine is trying to change this relationship, and lacks education in its actions. A referendum being held as we speak will nullify the west in Russia's eyes and the gaffe in Putin's speech on Crimea. BUt will not harm the Ukrainian state or the west. But the east is its fear, and Russia fears its citizens.

The politics of west versus east is an old one, and Europe means nothing except a belief in democracy and institutions. Russia needs this legitimacy and Europe is a Russian tactic, not a physical reality except in the European Union. The west is a kind of economic relationship and it is is not essential. But freedom from European institutions is, and the EU is bound to defend the Ukraine. Is Russia claiming it must defeat them? I suggest the response is from Putin alone and the proof is in this referendum. A free vote is the answer to his political legitimacy, like any politician, and more violent reaction may eventually follow.

Russian possibilities

While the attention of the world is on Syria, the Russian relationship with the Ukraine was under suspicion because of its proximity to Russian heartlands. Syria was perceived by the west to be in its sphere of interest, but the Ukraine which had a more successful revolution was forgotten. The rebellious republic image was replaced by an enlargement of the economic links Europe had been seeking in the 2000s over energy. The oil reserves in the North were not even allowed this political content, except as a source for terrorism and political movement. Russian foreign policy became beset by technical difficulties and Europe's reaction was seen as exploitative and miscellaneous.

The global view was also ignored, it was seen as joining the north in the technical revolutions of the twentieth century, but not enduring the luxury of twenty-first century politics. Russian foreign policy is best when it is placed in a European context, and the future of the Republics has never made it in substance. The democratic credentials prove this, Russia is a telegraph, it is a pity no-one can show divisions in the message. The summit again confused the issue, and transformation, not obligatory communications are the best part of the political bridge.

Russian foreign policy to South America, is again less than informative, and the division between conflict and consensus roughly driven by American and global communications. The third world was neither a division between north and west, or east and south, but the message did deliver it. The point lies in the political equality implied by the communications, neither political or economic they dwell on social questions and a political individualism. Mill would be resting quietly at the double meanings behind politics in the Ukraine and South America. The truth is politics is not about policy, and local interests are easily assuaged.

The Chinese take a different approach to global relationships, but the spheres of interests are similar and easy to uncover. Russia of course says nothing about its southern borders to Europe, but magnifies the realism in social analysis of conflictual relations. Foreign policy is therefore about communications, not institutions in foreign countries. Home divisions are left out of the question in ideology. The liberal ideal is not becoming a utopian dream in Russia, and this is disguised. Foreign policy is not that important, but our response is leading in its miscalculation in Russia, and in other areas. By transmitting realism, we are ignoring and misconstruing western interests. How important is it? If the divide is kept precise, only Russia looses, if it is confused neighbouring states lose out like the Ukraine. Hence the visit by Britain to China was wildly mistimed and German attempts to attract attention in America were badly intentioned.

Old age

The elderly and old age depend on different divisions according to social scientists, I argue old age is growing with the means of production and the elderly are in conflict with it. Capitalism is neither a stage for old age, nor a battle cry of the elderly, and this is why many disagree with capitalist theories of production. Old age is not a means of survival, it is a battle of generations and the elderly are respected as a division within it.

Capitalism is an integrative process and many in the business world have beneficial experiences of it. The elderly are a social framework, a kind of political resistance and old age an integration in a division of capitalist linguistic frameworks, that suggest globalisation is not what people make it, but is a kind of word that influences leaders. The elderly are therefore, not old and age is a category. Capitalism is threatening in this approach and the start of a new entity called globalism.

Capitalism is an integrative theory, a sort of approach to division that erases the status drop. But although this may approach the problem of old age, the unemployed are more likely to undermine it because of the institutions that uphold it. In my approach old age is more likely to fear capitalism as a psychology, and the elderly to have nothing to do with it. The integration is thorough the unemployment agencies which share national insurance with the old age agencies.

Does capitalism integrate the elderly? Of course it doesn't, although both are along the time line and it is unlikely that the elderly would know it either. In face generational disease is timed, and capitalism may be a way of transforming it to a smaller section of the population. Capitalism therefore is a psychological integration of old age. All institutions of the elderly are psychologically directed.

Politics of old age can also be looked at as a social integration, because mental health and other agencies direct the elderly and business has a social direction. The routines of parliaments are directed by these pressure groups and interest groups protect the latter. Capitalism may therefore be able to direct the elderly, and old age integrate with it if political leaders want that. The difficulty with this is institutions and their power over historical time.

East and South

The cause of the threat is many sided, but Europe is a two way relationship. Firstly Europe has Russian origins and Russia has an interest in its security relationship. The other side is the relations between Europe and the United States, this changes the function of the former in eastern approaches to the United States. Russia is therefore not a friend of Europe and the recent events in Syria reinforce this idea. Europe has an affinity for Russia, but is constantly rebuffed. The relationship is broken by European distrust and Europe plays its superiority against this joker in the pack. The effect is to distance Russian society from European elites. Secondly Russia is becoming divided in its approach to the Third World, and these signals undermine the antipathy between Russia and Europe's intellectual approach.

The price is its criticism of Russia to American audiences, the conflict between Russian homelands and their European neighbours and the diplomacy which has been hostile for about one hundred years. The method is to create barriers which the Russians overcome. The aims a sort of chess in which no-one actually can win, the game starts again after the interval and a game is what it is. The ending a kind of Russian ballet, in which the ballerina is in tears but the show carries on. The price is therefore nuanced and the relationship suffers in generational phases.

The cause has no conclusion, it is a question and there never is an answer. The reason is therefore power politics and the direction neither left nor right, a sort of neutral in a rusted gearbox. The European relationship overrides the social framework in this way, and like all politics is ultimately flawed because of this. The combination of factors is seen in the issues, the Falklands nationalism lie in a Cold War silence that people felt was suffocating them. The politician needed a victory with the background of the Cold War. The war in Afghanistan can be seen in the British approach to warlords. Like the isolation it gave continental Europe in the 1960s, Afghanistan was not let in and the French were allowed to participate and not partake in the planning process, at least in the Westminster sense. This Cold War was like the other one, and the light of day didn't find it for over ten years.

The cause of Europe's isolation takes angles as well. It is a crisis, but one which has been squashed because of a lack of answers. Can we make peace, not should we find the allies a new member. The difficulties of letting them in, this is not, but a lack of reception which has clear causes and consequences. This kind of power play is destructive, because Russia takes it seriously and the west feels the consequences. The playwright would say change the ending, the people cut one scene and the politicians lose a character in the plot. The division occupies intellectual minds, the ending unnerves Russian planners. Until recently the occupiers were undermining foreign forces, facing historical changes and threatening wars in Africa.

The threat of Europe is everywhere, because of its power apparently or its reach in history. I argue peace is worth it or at least the end of the Cold War. American participation is unlikely to be effective and ideological confrontation destructive. We need to shorten the game and take the queen, checkmate is not a Russia solution. The future lies in the social and the politics is upset by short battles. We are not passing a law, the game is military in character. The short approach is to define the goal and find a solution to our concern. It will achieve nothing if we play that game. Approach is not the end of the couplet, it is the beginning of the next conflict and not an answer.

The politics in Europe

The state of Washington was on strike last week, the country laughed at its President and Congress appeared to win the public backing. The real story is very different, ideology started to infiltrate the House of Representatives and the President needed to quell public disquiet. The figures of Afghanistan are not looking as predicted and the foreign policy against Russia is losing head way, as Syria gain enters the headlines. How does a President explain a climbdown, well Obama chose the Washington machine.

The politics seems obscure like our approach to any foreign country, but to bring in the public of American foreign policy is a complex task. Firstly each country interprets it differently and I suggest each country has a tailored message because of the real attempt to interpret foreign cultures. The globalisation is therefore much exaggerated and economic dependency is more American than eastern. The foreign policy is of course the same, and policy fails to match political or economic approaches. It is about politics and the problems of the Whitehouse machine.

The atlantic strike is therefore on our televisions, and Obama is portrayed differently in Washington than in London, the mix is authoritative and the equality ideological. never was it said America was concerned with the well being of all of us, and the attitude of the American public is logical. The politics is therefore an approach to liberalism, and there are many. The socialism found in Europe is hated and the distribution of wealth American.

The future lies in global economics, not a question of politics, but the calculation of declining resources and the approach to attitudes. The atlantic does the opposite and is resented by the European political ideological undercurrents. Westminster believes in a solution, and Paris a third way, this kind of division is not Washington's invention, but may be used by it. The atlantic is therefore a global structure and a decision based on globalisation. The problem is no-one likes being told to be disciplined, and Washington is reactive in this way.

The atlantic is globalisation to elites, but machines can divert political strategies and geography can change confident approaches based on background and socialisation. I suggest machines are shapes , a kind political star with six points. The problem is no-ne can agree on their direction. I suggest one is the church and is unknown at the moment. Another the bureaucracy and a third the local structures. The atlantic therefore is about learning, not action and this seems to be a European lead.

The television is of course a shape, the educational establishment. Unfortunately some countries don't tell you how it works. But the politics is of course unpredictable with a sharp division in Europe. The Mitterrand years were infamous in Paris for the joke, I seem to remember Chirac predicting his victory on the radio. But globalisation aside, the atlantic is no longer a way forward for European elites. The politics of Washington are therefore divisive and the economics more of a scientific test of virility. The politics will be a disaster, but for some countries that does not matter!

Inside goals

The wealth of the social state is powerful in a sense unexplained by the German election. A hint is that German economic prospects have risen with Merkel's election. The south has become more resistive to the claims industry and the northern mining towns are illustrative by their local flavour. I suggest the winner is less important than the contest, and the wealth of intrinsic understanding is biased in its approach to society.

The politics has been all conservative, but we must remember Merkel is from the east. The regions suggest to a political scientist that society is becoming more independent and less institutional. The sociologist would look at the northern towns by the sea for example Kiel and the sea shore.

The real local flavour to the British is the social understanding Merkel represents with the east, and the regions are left out of this equation. Globalisation has made Merkel front page talk and the articles in my blog emphasise the politics of local authority, and the central disquiet over its loss of significance. The external world is therefore optimistic about German reform, and soundbites like a German growth pattern undermine the sense in Anglo-German relations.

The social state is likely to change if Merkel is elected, the political democracy is non-aligned at the  instant of changing its leader. This means globalisation is not German and western as well as democratic. The inside of Germany s becoming more western, not eastern. The reason is the glasnost revisited by Putin's influence in Germany. The state is objective in its approach to the eastern menace, but in German minds, the reform is idealistic in Merkel's plan.

The westernisation of the threat is no longer viable in its interpretation and its measure. The rebooting of eastern democracy and the education process will produce model westerners and politics is no longer what it was. The Cold War is taking on new interpretation and the social security state a measure of austerity. New business orientations are less than favourable, and the wealth of industry taking shelter.

German foreign policy is more of a task for BBC viewers, it is sidelined between British and Russian approaches to international diplomacy and Obama has restricted its domestic audience. The ideology of the west is a advantage to German foreign policy and military approaches receive a large audience. The politics of the UK is particularly Prime Ministerial, but foreign policy Obama threatened is easier for German businesses to support.

Of course we did not, and the reach of Africa seems large in British newsrooms. The difficulty is Germany does not understand this issue apparently, and the growth of economic unitary policy is defending the reverse of bias to the right.  The German analysis is difficult without a domestic view of German history, but my readers can enter into the spirit of the German political background.

Nationalism

The problem with Spanish nationalism, is its direction. No-one can believe that they are the willing victims and globalisation has allowed terror tactics to invade international sovereign law. The Falklands is becoming one of those issues, where Argentina is clearly guilty of international war crimes. The war cost many untold British lives and Argentina has no rights to defend itself with, this the reason this conflict is becoming an issue in non-aligned states.

The Falklands has of course had many owners. The law is that it has independent status, but will not be vulnerable to international piracy. Here lies the problem, the war is becoming a cause in non-Anglo British territories and the intervention is now an historical complaint in British law. This matters not to those who can easily take the islands which lie off the Argentinian mainland. The other aligned states have less to gain, but a victory would please many political actors in the Spanish camp.

The military side is more complicated, because a British victory is not condoned by its allies. Even strategy has become an issue and the political conflict is neither desirable or detected by those on this side of the conflict. In fact a joint approach would solve the problem through international peace negotiations. But many aligned states have the opportunity to bring this about, and fail consistently to do so.

The Falklands remain a military district or close to it, and secrecy covers most of its tactics. The world has become a diplomatic stance about island, small and unheard of by most of its population. The Falklands is neither worth the cost or the effort of defending a political strategy of this uncertain calibre. But Argentina has nothing to lose either by giving up the territories. The Falklands has no oil as has been publicised to a degree which has increased pressure for war.

The social side is less exciting. The war has cost many combatants and non-combattants their lives, and is worthy in a sadistic way of the publicity this international division has caused. The Falklands is becoming a war grave issue, in fact the Argentinians have the most public record of their war dead. The islands may have caught the publicity of the newspapers, but the history is quite different and none of the British social cost is likely to be known.

The economic side may have British backers more excited, there is some chance that the islands could be told to surrender under certain terms and conditions and peace talks are not this side of the equation. The true loss is for soldiers and their families, the political actors have the Shakespearian sonnet. I like to thinks the children will be proud of their soldiers, I suggest they will never know why they fought or who was responsible.

The justice side is unenviable, international law is clouded on the issue of soldiers. But political actors are unlikely to be tried in this conflict. he state can well afford a diplomatic loss, and the winners will be those who pay the salaries of the bureaucrats like the Ministries of Defence. The Falklands are not responsible for the wars it concludes, the chance is low that other states will intervene. The history may suggest that globalisation was the real target of Argentina, but no international treaty is likely to declare it. The sense is that the islands care not at all and the winner is likely to be human rights.