British membership and Boris

The EU has attributes in foreign policy and political independence, the move against membership is driven by Conservative party division and social movements. The political separation will give economic independence and political inferiority to Westminster, but the out camp views global markets and increased growth as the likely outcome. Boris Johnson has career advantages in a political test of decision-making.

The Prime Minister negotiated a deal to resue the UK from this separation, sovereignty and political gain lay at the core of it. Other parts are inherited from previous encounters with the same question. Boris therefore can make new ground and Cameron has a large field of untested ground to play with. Boris' first strategy was to distance himself from the Prime Minister and he established himself as head of the out camp in the morning papers.

British membership of the EU has a different approach to the one faced now, coming out is easier than going in and could be quite uncomfortable for the PM. The reason is leaving is not new to British politics and other countries are easier to win over. Boris has to play the outraged Minister, something he does well and has been done in a similar context by Michael Heseltine. Mayor Boris has much to gain in funding and personal image, which might lead to a Prime Ministerial position.

Boris' second plan may be to undermine Labour on Europe. Since the 1970s Labour has been divided on the question, and held a referendum on  membership. The parties had internal factions, a state that exists when no discipline can undermine the authority of the different groups. Thirdly Boris may tackle the business community, as mayor he is in a good position because he attracts inward investment into London.

The question of globalisation and growth comes into it, and the defence was strong over the Single Market and EMU. It is on this issue that he is likely to fail, and older voters may come into the referendum's voting arithmetic. The EU is ideologically immune to these tests, one reason why the referendum was called. Boris Johnson may have lost key supporters over his move, but the referendum is unlikely to show it. A greater test lies uncertain and I argue may well confound his electoral ambitions.

The Republican election question

The independence process is a short one, and American elections are hazardous and dangerous affairs. Donald Trump is a seasoned campaigner and difficult to overcome, but traditional Democratic votes are more difficult to predict. The Trump phenomenon is a hot readers list favourite and Hilary is  a experienced and well advised candidate. But Trump is the likely winner except for the Presidential bear traps.

Hilary started with nothing to stop her, but her independence and intelligence is working against her. America takes it better from a man and Trump's attack on the Pope stole the limelight. The French Presidency is predictable, and caucuses remove this obstacle. Both are directly elected, but France is superior because its centralisation and bicameral nature allows the Prime Minister to have  a veto position.

Hilary seems to have played out this role in the hustings, but her choice of opponent is likley to trump her. Again like with Obama, the framework is not ticking in her favour. I suggest the British example is predicting a conservative victory and the threat comes from the establishment. The Democrats need to win in foreign constituencies, like Hispanics and cities. But Trump has the headlines there.

Foreign capitals are also important and can assuage the vote. The UK and France are indicating that a Republican victory would help. Arabia is supportive. Opposing powers influnce the black vote, which is unlikly to support conservatives. I believe an interest is important and a risk, and Hilary has this vote, traditionally a Republican one.

The votes in the South are therefore pointing to the periphery and the north is heading right. The reason is not only socio-economic. The periphery are well after Obama and the north is more liberal. It would not be difficult for Hilary to change the dynamics of a left-right shift. The other point is this would bring in foreign capitals and traditional voters. Hilary Clinton can still win.

Trump is leading bacause he has shown leadership and a black sense of identity. He could swap liberal voters for Rupublican frameworks and gain the foreign vote from a reflex action against Obama. The shift is left-right and principle economic, but socially the gain is right-special constituency. The question is was the Pope showing a leadership judgement which will be taken seriously. I doubt it because of religion.

Syria

The threat to Russia from Syria is tiny compared to the effect of Turkey on Russia. The reason is Turkey is a decision-maker in NATO. The wealth of Syria is inconsequential, and has targeted Russian diplomacy. Syria has taken on authority and is deciding to accept Russian terms.

The friend has turned angry and the extent of empire knows no bounds. Cuba comes to mind, but for both sides. The enemy is clandestine, and the origins successful. The frame is objective, and Syria has become subjective.

The refugees are threatening, because its allies have betrayed them. I suggest the change is becoming hard. Why does a shelter have significance. The direction of growth is left, but decisions are leaning right. The reaction is Syrian and the frame is baseline.

The future of the country is in centre, and the local is destroyed, yet Russia keeps saying not one. I argue this is about interests, and we are allying with Russia. America is going for domesticity, and Russia has a portal. Let's save the Syrians we can, and remember whose interests this is in.

The lost monach

The monarchy is subtly more powerful than the aristocracy, euro bonds are less powerful than frameworks and politics is cultural. The monarchy is led not a charity or an institution. The cost is less important than the decline of markets. The system is a kind of charity, raising huge sums of money and vulnerable to market depression.

I argue monarchies are easily replaced, but the history is on their side. The bombing of Mountbatten was immense in historical memory, and the time became fixed. The Spanish civil war is a framework, not a beginning. The French Revolution about modern France and the history expands with each French Republic. The civilian rule in Germany is through principles, not monarchical and developed through stages.

The changeover was political, but the method was social, the long term redressed the balance. To avoid change the monarch needs a political settlement. Scotland has both political and social links to the UK's monach. Ireland is sovereign like Germany. The U.K. is secure in its direction, but political change would be the origins of its demise.

The government in opposition has raised the issue of reform and the British are concerned over social identity. The constitution is framed by these rules, and democratic legitimacy is required for reform. The monach has also been in power for half a century and not thought to be under review in terms of experience or stability. Reform could come from abroad and radical policies, because external threats are powerful influences on the monach. Radical elements also have undermined sovereign power through the regions.

The risk

The threat to institutions comes from the risk its inhabitants face in search of the truth in their lives, not the organisation of power in the attempt at reaching equal status to other residents. The risk is the nature of the individual, not the cause of the problem and the power of the inmates is not measured by the events they go through. I argue the influence is the construction of authority and how you challenge it, not the nature or meaning of it in objective terms. The institution is an external position in relation to interests and the structure of ideology.

The elderly face uphill tasks in their self appraisal of the face others give them. I suggest that the reach of the institution has no bearing, but the power of individual members has a status impact on their lives and not the meaning they attach to them. The institution is a possibility, an image, not a disability and the influence of staff similar to bathing or finding help in terms of meetings and clothing. The risk is in challenging other views of those around them on these points and not in the daily tasks done for them. Accidents are of meaningful translation, not the risk to the institution.

The elderly face problems of relatives, do staff recognise their rights in implementing the threat to those who challenge them. I agree that staff have rights, but how can they be the same entities? The reach of the institution is in the outside, a world that can challenge definitions and the influence of fascilities for recognition. I suggest these are personal, and the elderly face extremities of threat and comfort in this way. The other point is cognition, and institutions are relevant to internal cognition as well as structural types.

The problem for the elderly is not this meaning, but the external impact of long-term effects. This is the institution's public face and meaning is not recognised. The latter is why the elderly do not decide to change their situation. By public and private faces I mean the social impact of institutional methods. The risk to institution is great, but the power of politics much higher on institutional to do lists. The elderly risk being undermined by this organisation, and the power of groups is set to challenge these definitions in objective interests.

UK's relationship

Chinese politics is based on risk, the visit by its President to the UK was a political signal to its elite that the centralisation of policy would continue. The Commonwealth is based on trade, but its centralisation is a political not policy signal. The visit reassured Huang that the UK had no interests in its region, the UK was more concerned with presitige and trade, an agreement was in Chinese interests. Centralised policty means closed borders and territorial integrity. The UK has interests in nuclear fuel because of low prices and the hope of access to markets in the far east.

The India dimension is fairly straightforward, India is a regional power and the UK has historical prestige in a close relationship with it. China is a friend which has no social comparison to the UK and the UK likes to invest resources on its territory, because of cheap labour and low regulation. The power relationship is less easy. The power in India is in structures, not institutions, the UK would like to exploit these links. China is in a similar position to the UK, and India has an historical power division in this area. The ideology is in structures and will the UK harm either country's interests.

Foreign policy is a structure and power an institutional division. I suggest China fears the UK history in the region, but has not assessed UK political culture and India is mindful of domestic interests looking towards new ties and not old benefactors. In other words the UK will not be a policy interest. China has centralised institutions, and structure is a regional battleground. The Chinese will wonder why the UK chose this moment, I suggest China has been reluctant. The visits to London by India and Chinese leaders are evidence of a reconciliatry move.

The UK policy is in trade through Europe and Japan, sometimes difficult for UK audiences. India and China may have political points, but trade depends on sea routes and trade deals not political demands. China understands this and is ready for a UK deal, will our suppliers trust it. India is less ready to concede its economic reach, possibly because of experience in dealing with the UK. Centralisation and regional power are important in these dynamics. The risk is China doesn't need the UK, and UK needs China. 

The system of peasants

The system is not ideological, the purpose is to use and exert will over politics and undermine reform to traditions and statements like religion or family cohesion. The argument is to undermine the reformers and fascilitate those who dislike community and shared beliefs. This is confusing, the politics looks like it from the outside, like left and right it is an older form, a kind of social uprising based on rules and understandings. It is not so much an expereince as a belief in something beyond the norm.

I undermine the beliefs by joining recent movements and threatening continuity. The challenge is to frame those around you and strengthen local ties. Why? It starts a movement and risks ignoring central and unpopular powers. The UK was threatened in the colonies and France has been in recent terrorist incidents. The politics may be northern, but it comes form a kind of 60s mentality that right is known and  leaders are useless.

The local spirit is important for the movement and the centre feels its is comical. But traditions are based on it and France has an agricultural base like this. The peasants reject the validity of lives outside this framework and the animals are often worshiped. The social movement is an economic entity, based on power it pays through contributions as community structures insert. The terrorits may have had their own aims, but would have has an education in this kind of belief system.

The politics of the UK is different, but social movements do exist and political parties appear to be strengthening their reach. The government needs to realise that victims have collateral, and although their structures continue, their leaders do not. The arabs have similar movements as in Egypt. But they do not cross international frontiers except through education. Like the colonisers, we will be threatened by these movements even from beyond our shores. I suggest we assert rationality and impose authority in education.